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The Clean Energy Future Act (the Act) includes an 
important innovation in Australian climate policy: for 
the first time, the law opens up the possibility of a 
way to link short- and long-term emissions 
reduction targets to a scientifically robust ‘carbon 
budget’ for the nation. 
The development of this national carbon budget is 
now central to the deliberations of the Climate 
Change Authority (the Authority). The Authority is an 
independent body, which provides advice to the 
Parliament on climate policy. The Authority’s first 
targets and trajectory review is currently underway 
and must be completed by 28th February 2014. An 
issues paper will be released in April and draft 
recommendations are due in October 2013. The 
review must make recommendations for an 
‘indicative national emissions trajectory and a 
national carbon budget’ (emphasis added).  
The concept of a carbon budget is important in 
climate policy. The magnitude of climate change is 
not determined by emissions in any given year, but 
the total level of pollution released over time. The 
word ‘budget’ is used deliberately. If we save less 
now we have to save more later and vice versa. The 
longer you delay action the more you pay to catch 
up. 
The challenge for the Authority is that a national 
carbon budget is not sharply defined in the Clean 
Energy Act; it is broadly described as ‘the total 
amount of net Australian emissions of greenhouse 
gases during a specified period’. A number, or 
combination, of carbon budget approaches could 
be undertaken by the Climate Change Authority: 
+ Long-term budget: Define the total allowable 
cumulative emissions over a long-term period 
based on a judgement of Australia’s equitable 
contribution to avoiding dangerous climate 
change. For example, a total of eight billion 
tonnes between 2010 and 2050 could be 
released based on one assessment of our fair 
share of a 1,500 billion tonne global budget. This 
global budget would give around 75 per cent 
change of avoiding a 2oC increase in global 
temperature. 
+ Trajectory and target budget: Define an 
indicative national long-term emission trajectory 
or target and define carbon budgets with shorter 
timeframes consistent with this emissions 
pathway. For example, 80 per cent emission 
reduction by 2050 and five year carbon budgets 
for 2015-2020, 2021-2025 and 2026-2030. 
+ Short-term budget: Define emission reduction 
targets in the near-term. For example, 
Australia’s Kyoto target of around 4.6 billion 
tonnes of carbon emissions from 2013-2020.    
The principle strength of a long-term budget is that 
provides a transparent and direct link to a defined 
climate outcome. Australia is highly vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change and the Act’s objectives 
state that Australia’s national interest is in ensuring 
that global temperatures do not increase by more 
than 2oC above pre-industrial levels.  
Numerous assessments have demonstrated that 
global warming above 2oC would lead to substantial 
costs to Australia’s economic, human and natural 
systems and would exceed the adaptive capacity of 
key Australian industry sectors.   
The total amount of global emissions can be 
calculated to gives a reasonably high probability of 
achieving this the 2oC goal. A national budget can 
then be directly calculated based on a judgement of 
an equitable contribution from Australia to this 
global carbon budget.  
Summary 
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By themselves, both short-term and trajectory and 
target budgets, provide only a weak link to the 
global carbon budget and Australia’s national 
interest. This increases the risks that shorter-term 
targets may be set without explicit reference to 
avoiding dangerous climate change.  
Action to reduce emissions will not stop in 2020. 
How a carbon budget is defined can have an impact 
on short-term decision making and implications for 
a long-term emissions reduction pathway. If the 
Climate Change Authority does not consider a long-
term budget when it makes recommendations 
around short-term emissions pathway it increases 
the risk that more dramatic and draconian emissions 
reductions will be required post 2020 to meet 
national goals and our emerging international 
commitments. 
The Climate Institute has calculated a number of 
long-term national carbon budgets for Australia. 
This gives a broad range of budgets for Australia of 
between 4 billion tonnes to 15 billion tonnes from 
2010 to 2050. This range represents the reality that 
while scientists can advise on appropriate global 
budgets, just how this pie should be shared is, 
ultimately, a question of equity.  
To assess the equity implications of the indicative 
Australian budgets, each is converted to a per-
capita allocation. Under most of the assessed 
budgets Australians would use significantly more of 
the global budget than an average person in either 
developed or developing economies.  
Unless the metrics used to assess our equitable 
share of the global budget explicitly factors in our 
relatively small population’s high carbon footprint, 
then policy makers are implying it is acceptable for 
Australians to consume more of the global carbon 
budget than most other people for the next 40 
years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, a budget based on the Government’s 
minimum 5 per cent 2020 emission target and 80 
per cent target by 2050 would see Australians use 
four times as much of the global budget as the 
average person globally. Put another way if other 
countries emitted, per person, a comparable 
amount of emissions to that implied by Australia’s 
current emission targets then total emissions to 
2050 would be equivalent to a world where 
temperatures increase by 4-6oC by 2100. 
A useful benchmark of fairness could be an 
assurance that, at minimum, the average Australian 
consumes no more of the global budget than the 
average person in other advanced economies. This 
suggests an Australian carbon budget of around 8 
billion tonnes from 2010 to 2050. 
The Climate Institute’s key recommends are that an 
Australian carbon budget should be: 
+ Consistent with the national interest (as 
defined by the Act): Australia’s carbon budget 
should be based on a global budget which has a 
high probability of ‘ensuring that average global 
temperatures increase by not more than 2 
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels’. 
 
+ Focus on the long-term: The Climate Change 
Authority should outline an Australia’s carbon 
budget to 2050.  This would provide guidance to 
short-term cap setting processes and the 
longer-term indicative emissions pathway to 
2030 and 2050. There is little additional value in 
setting carbon budget to 2020 alone.  
 
+ Hedge against stronger action: The budget 
and associated emission pathways should be 
set to ensure it hedges against the possibility of 
even more ambitious action in the future (e.g. 
1.5oC global goal currently under consideration 
under the UNFCCC). 
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The Clean Energy Future Act (the Act) includes an 
important innovation in Australian climate policy: for 
the first time, the law opens up the possibility of a 
way to link short- and long-term emissions 
reduction targets to a scientifically robust ‘carbon 
budget’ for the nation. 
The concept of a carbon budget is important in 
climate policy. The magnitude of climate change is 
not determined by emissions in any given year, but 
the total level of pollution released over time. For 
example, researchers recently found that global 
emissions in 2020 are less important for avoiding a  
 
Figure 1. Carbon budgets and emission 
pathways. If total global emissions peak later, 
reductions around 2050 need to be more ambitious. 
Also, once serious action begins the rate of change 
needs to be much steeper if the same cumulative 
emission budget is to be achieved between 2000 
and 2050.1   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2oC increase in global temperature above pre-
industrial levels than the total amount of emissions 
released between now and 2050.2 However, early 
action can significantly affect the rate and 
magnitude of emission reductions required at a later 
date (see Fig. 1). 
The word ‘budget’ is therefore used deliberately to 
stress that only a limited amount of pollution may be 
released without global temperatures or other 
environmental limit crossing an agreed threshold.  
The implication is that if we save less now we have 
to save more later and vice versa.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 
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In Australia, carbon budgets are now central to the 
deliberations of the Climate Change Authority (the 
Authority). The Authority is an independent body, 
which will provide advice to the Parliament on 
climate policy. It will advise on the level of shorter-
term carbon pollution caps; define an indicative 
national emissions trajectory and national carbon 
budget; and assess Australia’s progress towards 
achieving its emissions reduction targets and any 
national carbon budget. 
The Authority’s first targets and trajectory review 
must be completed by 28th February 2014 and must 
make recommendations for an ‘indicative national 
emissions trajectory and a national carbon budget’ 
(emphasis added). This ‘must’ consider the global 
carbon budget.3   
An issues paper is to be released in April and a draft 
report on October 2013. 
In defining Australia’s carbon budget, the Authority 
must act in ways that are consistent with the 
objectives of the Act. The objects of the Act that are 
particularly relevant4 include:5 
To give effect to Australia’s obligations under: (i) 
the Climate Change Convention; and (ii) the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
To support the development of an effective global 
response to climate change, consistent with 
Australia’s national interest in ensuring that 
average global temperatures increase by not more 
than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. 
Take action directed towards meeting Australia’s 
long term target of reducing Australia’s net 
greenhouse gas emissions to 80% below 2000 
levels by 2050. 
 
 
Under the UN’s Climate Change Convention 
(UNFCCC), Australia has agreed to participate in 
international action to limit global warming to less 
than 2oC above preindustrial levels. The international 
community will discuss strengthening this goal to 
1.5oC by 2015.6  
Numerous assessments have demonstrated that 
global warming above 2oC would lead to substantial 
costs to Australia’s economic, human and natural 
systems and would exceed the adaptive capacity of 
key Australian industry sectors.7,8,9,10   
For example, a report to Treasury by one of 
Australia leading climate experts indicated that only 
3oC increase in global temperature could result in 
the following impacts on Australia:11 
+ Natural ecosystems: Total realignment of 
ecosystems across Australia, with risks to 
ecosystem services. Total loss of alpine 
environments, major incursions of pests, weeds 
and diseases. 
+ Water availability: Dangerous water shortages. 
Provision of water becomes a serious limiting 
factor in population growth, production of food 
and protection of natural ecosystems. 
+ Coastal communities: Coastal inundation and 
erosion requires abandonment of some coastal 
developments or the construction of sea walls. 
Impacts are significant for low-lying regions (e.g. 
Cairns, Gold Coast). 
+ Agriculture: Substantially reduced production 
capacity. Natural and agricultural systems will 
show little resemblance to current systems, with 
some serious risks. Coping capacity may be 
tested in a number of regions or sectors. 
+ Human health: Risks to human life from 
flooding, disease, storms. Coping capacity  
Carbon Budgeting 
and the Climate Change Authority  
 
  7 
 
 
severely tested in some areas, with some public 
health interventions essential. 
+ Major Infrastructure: Infrastructure destruction 
from flooding, soil erosion, siltation, 
inappropriate infrastructure, loss of livestock, 
crops, and human life. Requires enhanced 
emergency services, insurance and building 
regulation. 
+ International pressures: International militancy 
and conflict. Water shortage for half the world’s 
people, health problems for 250 million, and 
hundreds of millions facing food shortages and 
coastal inundation.  Humanitarian aid grows and 
regional security is jeopardised. 
This policy brief examines the possible approaches 
the Authority may take to meet its mandate of 
setting a national carbon budget. It then proposes a 
carbon budget framework, calculates a number of 
possible carbon budgets for Australia, and examines 
their implications.   
It is important to note that this paper does not 
prescribe any particular carbon budget for Australia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
but simply illustrates the issues that confront the 
Authority and makes policy recommendations 
accordingly. For example, the paper outlines some 
possible methods to define Australia’s contribution 
towards a given global carbon budget, but these are 
by no means exhaustive. Indeed, there are other 
approaches that could be used that are not 
discussed here as a full discussion of carbon 
budget allocation methods is outside the scope of 
this paper.12 
It is also critical to note upfront that the definition of 
an Australian carbon budget is in addition to the 
recommendations that the Authority will make on 
the national emission 2020 targets, long-term 
trajectory and pollution caps on covered sectors to 
2020. All of these policy decisions interact and if 
combined well would enhance Australia’s climate 
policy environment. For example, our short-term 
cap and targets create immediate accountability and 
longer-term trajectories provide direction to 
investors on the speed of required emission 
reductions. Carbon budgets potentially provide 
different roles as outlined below.  
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A carbon budget is not sharply defined in the Act; it 
is broadly described as ‘the total amount of net 
Australian emissions of greenhouse gases during a 
specified period’.13 
A number of carbon budget approaches have been 
used and proposed internationally. Table 1 sets out 
some of their strengths and weaknesses. As Fig 5 
illustrates these approaches are not mutually 
exclusive and a number of approaches could be 
applied. 
 
+ Long-term budgets (Fig. 2): Define the total 
allowable cumulative emissions over a long-term 
period based on a judgement of Australia’s 
equitable contribution to a global carbon 
budget. In other words, the total amount of 
emissions that can be ‘spent’ over the long-term 
is calculated. Scientists and climate policy 
groups generally support this approach.14,15,16,17 
To guide policy, this figure can be broken down 
into smaller budgets for specific periods of time 
(particularly in the near term, Fig 5).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. An example of a long-term budget. The 
blue area is the total amount of emissions that could 
be emitted over the period to 2050. In this case it is 
based on the total amount of emissions under the 
dotted line, or an emission pathway consistent with 
a 25 per cent reduction by 2020 and an 80 per cent 
reduction by 2050 (both on 2000 levels). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carbon Budget 
Approaches 
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+ Trajectory and targets (Fig. 3): Define an 
indicative national long-term emission trajectory 
or target and define carbon budgets with shorter 
timeframes and targets consistent with this 
emissions pathway. This is the approach taken 
by the British Government. The UK Climate 
Change Act (2008) establishes a legally binding 
target to reduce the country’s domestic 
emissions to at least 80 per cent below 1990 
levels by 2050. Five-year carbon budgets are 
then defined consistent with this target. The first 
four carbon budgets have been set for 2008–
2012, 2013–2017, 2018–2022 and 2023–2027. 
 
 
Figure 3. An example of a targets and trajectory 
budget. A number of short-term carbon budgets are 
set based on a long-term emissions pathway. 
 
 
 
 
 
+ Short-term budgets (Fig. 4): Define emission 
reduction targets for near-term time scales.  This 
is the approach taken in the Kyoto Protocol. To 
be able to compare countries and assess 
compliance with targets, these reduction goals 
are translated into a budget for the time period 
involved. In the case of Kyoto’s first 
commitment period, this is five years, and the 
second commitment period eight years. While 
this approach still uses a budget, the 
fundamental difference is the starting point. The 
budget is calculated from the emissions 
reduction target chosen—which may or may not 
be in line with a longer term trajectory to meet a 
specific temperature limit—as opposed to the 
global carbon budget approach in which the 
total figure is agreed based on a defined 
environmental limit.  
 
Figure 4. An example of short-term budget. A 
short-term budget is set with little reference to the 
long-term emissions reduction pathway. Australia 
will have short-term budget from 2013 to 2020 
under the Kyoto Protocol of around 4.6 billion 
tonnes. 
 
 
Figure 5. Combination of short and long-term 
budgets with an emission pathway. A short-term 
budget is set and defines immediate commitments 
to reduce emissions. A 2030 emission target and 
long-term trajectory (or range of either) is also set in 
reference to the long-term carbon budget (or vice 
versa).  
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Approach Strength Weakness 
Long-term budget + Potentially scientifically robust as long-
term cumulative emissions are strong 
indicators of commitment to an agreed 
global temperature limit (or other goal). 
+ Climate Change Authority must consider 
global carbon budgets. Using this 
approach provides a transparent and 
strong link between defined Australian 
and global carbon budgets.  
+ Provides a strong link between short-
term targets and longer-term goals, i.e. 
provides a frame with which to assess 
the adequacy of short-term targets and 
ensure that they don’t compromise the 
capacity to achieve long-term goal. 
+ Provides a clearer, longer-term 
investment signal to guide investment 
decisions on emitting activities (for 
example, encourage greater research 
and development investment in 
innovative technologies). 
+ Provides clear signal to the international 
community of nation’s preparedness to 
contribute to meeting the objectives of 
the UNFCCC and other international 
agreements (e.g. 1.5-2oC global goals).  
+ Politically more difficult. Defining a 
national carbon budget based on a global 
budget requires an explicit analysis of how 
emissions are allocated between countries 
and intergenerational equity. This in turn 
requires policy makers to consider the 
needs of future generations and the 
impact on people worldwide.  
+ Coordination between domestic and 
international views of an appropriate 
division of effort becomes difficult (for 
example, the long-term budget may be set 
that is inconsistent with the actions of 
other countries). 
+ There is potential to lock in a suboptimal 
climate change outcome if the budget is 
not set based on the precautionary 
principle or a hedging strategy. However, 
this point applies to any approach 
adopted if low-ambition options are 
enshrined. 
Trajectory and targets + Provides a clear signal to guide 
investment decisions on emitting 
activities, as the desired endpoint is 
known.  
+ Politically more palatable as equitable 
contribution to global effort is not 
necessarily defined transparently or 
needed. 
+ Near-term budgets help provide shorter-
term accountability. 
+ Provides clear signal to the international 
community of nation’s preparedness to 
contribution to long-term emission 
reductions. 
+ Potentially, less scientifically robust with 
only a weak link to the global budget. This 
could allow emissions over time 
inconsistent with broader climate goals.  
+ Short-term targets may be set without 
explicit reference to climate goals. 
+ Potentially, weak link to meeting 
obligations to avoid dangerous climate 
change (objective of the UNFCCC).  
Short-term 
 
+ Provides flexibility in meeting short-term 
targets. 
+ Near-term budgets help provide shorter-
term accountability. 
+ Can be specifically calibrated to the 
actions of other nations and existing 
technology. In the longer-term these 
factors are more uncertain. 
+ Links directly to current commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol.  
+ Little or no direct link to longer-term goals, 
global budget and science. 
+ Depending on the rules, short-term 
budget period boundaries may encourage 
conservative approaches to 
commitments, where a more continuous 
approach would not.   
+ Does nothing to strengthen investment 
certainty. 
 
Table 1. Strengths and weaknesses of various carbon-budget approaches.  
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Australia has already agreed to implement a short-
term carbon budget for the period 2013–2020 under 
its agreement to the second commitment period of 
the Kyoto Protocol. The Department of Climate 
Change and Energy Efficiency calculate this national 
carbon budget to be 4.626 billion tonnes over the 
period 2013–2020.18  
In setting the national target and emissions cap, the 
Climate Change Authority also needs to consider 
the approximately 40 per cent of national emissions 
from sectors not covered by the domestic emission 
trading scheme (e.g. transport sector emissions).19 A 
short-term carbon budget could help to ensure that 
the cap is set at levels consistent with the national 
budget when the projected emissions from 
uncovered sectors are considered. 
However, beyond consistency with quantified 
international commitments and flexibility in meeting 
national targets, there is little additional value to 
short-term carbon budgets in the Australian context. 
The emissions trading scheme itself is designed to 
be consistent with Australia’s short-term 
international obligations and features—such as the 
banking and borrowing of emission units, and 
international trading—provide adequate flexibility to 
meet short-term emission caps.  
A stronger approach is an indicative national long-
term emissions trajectory, in which sits a series of 
defined short-term carbon budgets consistent with a 
2050 target. However, the risk is that short-term 
politics will take precedence over long-term 
planning; a national emissions pathway could well 
be set that is inconsistent with the global carbon 
budget. Moreover, unless all short- and medium-
term budgets are defined up-front, there is also a 
risk that the budgets do not reference or are 
inconsistent with longer-term climate goals.  
 
These weaknesses could be addressed by ensuring 
that the longer-term trajectory in this approach is set 
based on a global carbon budget. In doing this a 
long-term national budget would need to be either 
implicitly or explicitly defined. This raises the 
question why this would not be undertaken 
transparently from the outset.  
Setting a national contribution to a global carbon 
budget based on Australia national interest appears 
the strongest approach if an equitable contribution 
to global action can be defined. Recent work by the 
Swiss Federal Office of the Environment and the 
Institute for Atmospheric and Climate Science 
illustrates how different allocation methods can yield 
very different results (Table 2). The subject has been 
discussed in the literature however and the Climate 
Change Authority will not be able to avoid 
considering equity in its decision-making around 
setting short-term caps and targets. 
Setting a long-term national budget based on 
avoiding a 2oC to 1.5oC increase in global 
temperature would also signal Australia’s willingness 
to play its fair part if global emission reductions. 
While, setting a long-term emission reduction 
pathway could also potentially achieve this goal, a 
national budget based on a global budget gives an 
explicit and transparent link avoiding an agreed 
change in global temperature. 
Fig 6 sets out The Climate Institute’s proposed 
framework for a national carbon budget. It sets out 
the interaction with short term targets and caps, the 
national emission trajectory, the global carbon 
budget and Australia’s stated national interest goal. 
 
Which type of carbon budget 
for Australia? 
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Table 2. Indicative carbon budgets and 2050 
emissions levels consistent with avoiding a 2oC 
increase in global temperature.20 
 
Hedging uncertainty and climate risk 
 
There are a number of uncertainties inherent in a 
long-term science-based budget. For example: 
 
+ Scientific uncertainties. In particular, the 
sensitivity of the climate system to rising 
greenhouse gas concentrations and impacts—
these impact significantly on the definition of a 
global carbon budget to meet a certain climate 
goal. Probability assessments can help policy 
makers to manage this uncertainty.21 
 
+ Technological uncertainty. The technological 
feasibility of avoiding 1.5–2oC has been tested in 
numerous studies.22 Avoiding a rise in mean 
global temperature of this magnitude is 
economically and technologically feasible. The 
critical factors are political will, the participation 
of all major emitters in emission reductions, and 
the deployment of a broad range of pollution 
reduction technologies. 
 
This modelling shows excluding technological 
options generally does not preclude meeting the 
goals but it does may increase the cost of 
achieving the targets.  The exception is access 
to technologies that allow for negative emissions 
(e.g. bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, 
afforestation) and the large-scale deployment of 
energy efficiency. The inclusion of these options 
appears to be a precondition for avoiding a 2-
degree world.23 The development of negative 
emission technologies on the scale required 
remains a key uncertainty.  
 
+ Political uncertainty. How will the next 
international agreement capture the 
commitments of other major emitters? What 
happens if they step back from or significantly 
accelerate their current efforts? Current efforts 
internationally are inconsistent with a 2-degree 
world so why set a budget based on this goal? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uncertainty does not mean a decision on a long-
term budget cannot be made. The very nature of 
any long-term budget is that will be non-binding. It 
is a guide to policy making, not a rule. The Act also 
provides for regular reviews of Australia’s carbon 
budget allowing it to be adjusted as new information 
emerges. 
 
Regardless of the type of budget it should be based 
on the precautionary principle and a ‘hedging’ 
strategy to better deal with uncertainty.24 That is, 
ensure that short-term actions do not rule out the 
possibility of achieving long-term objectives. As the 
International Energy Agency, CSIRO and others 
have concluded, this implies stronger not weaker 
longer-term climate goals.25,26 For example, weaker 
climate goals could lead to investments in long-term 
infrastructure that may be forced into early 
retirement to meet a new and more stringent policy 
regime set at a later date. 
 
At a minimum, a long-term budget should be set: 
 
+ Based on the defined national interest of 
avoiding a 2oC increase in mean global 
temperature above preindustrial levels, and; 
+ To hedge against the possibility that the 
global goal to reduce emissions may be 
strengthened to 1.5oC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Allocation method Total CO2 budget — billion 
tCO2, 2010–2050 
(% of business as usual) 
2050 emissions level — % of 
1990 levels 
 Annex 1 Non-
Annex 1 
Aust./NZ* Annex 1 Non-
Annex 1 
Aust./NZ 
Indian proposal — per-capita emissions 
converge towards levels consistent with avoiding 
2oC; individual developing countries participate 
when they reach certain per capita or emissions 
thresholds. 
391 
 
(56%) 
1,015 
 
(64%) 
 N/A -85% +8% -86% 
Equal cumulative per capita — every country 
has equal per capita emissions between 1990 
and 2100.  
176 
 
(25%) 
1,039 
 
(65%) 
 N/A -127% +92% -160% 
Responsibility/Capacity Indicator — 
contribution defined by per capita emissions over 
previous 10 years and per capita GDP.  
429 
 
(61%) 
978 
 
(61%) 
 N/A -82% -5% -75% 
Figure 6: Proposed national carbon udget framework. 1. Guided by the national interest established 
in the Act a global carbon bu get is d fi ed. 2. A fair 2010-2050 carbon budget for Australia is then 
devel ped based on an equ table contribution to the global budget. 3. This national budget guides 
decisi s on Australia’s final 2020 targ t, short-term carbon budget and emission cap on covered sectors. 
It also influences 2030 and 2050 emission pathways. Short-term accountability is set by the 2020 target, 
short-ter  budget and the legal requirements on liable industries under the cap on covered sector 
emissions.  
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Other policy details of the carbon 
budget 
A number of other policy issues need to be resolved 
in the preparation of a carbon budget. These 
include: national vs. sectoral coverage, carbon 
dioxide (CO2) vs. a broad range of greenhouse 
gases (CO2-equivalent), and a domestic budget vs. 
net of international trade. 
Given the Act defines a carbon budget as ‘the total 
amount of net Australian emissions of greenhouse 
gases’,33 it can be assumed that the budget has 
national coverage, including the land sector, 
accounts for the current basket of Kyoto Protocol 
greenhouse gases, and is net of international 
trading. 
The various proposed frameworks present different 
ways of dealing with these issues. For example, the 
German Advisory Group on Global Change suggests 
setting national budgets based on fossil fuel CO2 
only.34 This would mean other gases and sectors are 
dealt with via different mechanisms. 
There is a scientific case for carbon budgets based 
on fossil fuel emissions of CO2 only. Caution should 
be exercised when directly comparing reductions in 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and the use of land-
use related carbon sinks. Today’s carbon sinks are 
possibly tomorrow’s sources and carbon sinks may 
not bind the carbon permanently. In the long term, 
enhancing carbon sinks is not equivalent to 
restricting fossil fuel emissions.35 
For this reason, the Climate Change Authority 
should assess the implications of a carbon budget 
based on net national emissions versus one that is 
based on fossil CO2 only.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicative Australian Carbon 
Budgets 
Analysts have proposed two board ways to allocate 
the global carbon budget. ‘Top down’ allocation 
schemes use various approaches to assign national 
budgets while ‘bottom up’ budgets add up the 
individual pledges of national governments to a 
global level.36 Two types of Australian long-term 
budgets are calculated below. As outlined in the 
introduction these are by no means exhaustive and 
other approaches that could be used to define an 
Australian carbon budget. The totality of approaches 
below is however likely to capture the range of 
potential long-term carbon budgets for Australia. 
+ Bottom-up budgets. These are defined by 
the targets set in Australia’s domestic 
legislation. Targets only have limited 
reference to the global goal of avoiding a 
2oC increase in global temperature.  
+ Top-down budgets. The top-down targets 
are defined with a direct reference to the 2oC 
goal—by allocating a certain amount of the 
global budget to Australia. 
Bottom up budgets   
Carbon budgets are calculated by adding total 
emissions from 2010 to 2050 for the range of the 
Government’s emission targets. These assume a 
linear reduction in emissions from current levels to 
stated 2020 and 2050 targets. 
The Government’s policy is 5–25 per cent below 
2000 levels by 2020 and down to 80 per cent 
reductions on 2000 levels by 2050. (Bipartisan 
support for the 2020 targets exists but the 
Coalition’s support for long-term emission 
reductions remains unclear.)  
The Government’s policy implies a 2010–2050 
emissions budget of between 13 and 15 billion 
tonnes. 
Top-down budgets 
It is assumed that between now and 2050 a global 
budget of 1,500 billion tonnes of CO2-e is set. This 
gives a reasonable chance—approximately 75 per 
cent—of limiting average global temperature rise to 
no more than 2oC.37  
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Note that by 2015 the international community will 
have reviewed the global 2-degree goal, with a view 
to replacing it with a 1.5oC. Global budgets 
consistent with this goal are not considered here 
since, for most of the first half of the century, a 
1.5oC emissions pathway is similar to a likely 2oC 
emissions pathway.38 To achieve the 1.5oC goal 
much stronger emission limits are required post-
2030 and defining a 1.5oC budget would require 
assessing a budget to 2100. The hedging approach 
towards setting Australia’s budget outlined above 
would imply an assessment of the 1.5oC goal and its 
budget implications is required by the Climate 
Change Authority (See Box: Hedging uncertainty 
and climate risk). 
After the global budget has been set the following 
methods were used to define Australia’s fair share: 
+ Cumulative per capita convergence: This 
approach is similar that that proposed by the 
German Advisory Group on Global Change 
(WGBU). WGBU recommend defining national 
carbon budgets by multiplying the global budget 
by the country’s proportion of global population 
in a given year. *† This approach is essentially the 
same as used recently by the ANU Centre for 
Climate Law and Policy39 and similar that that 
suggested by China at the UNFCCC.40 It results 
in an Australian carbon budget of around 4 
billion tonnes between 2010 and 2050. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
* All population data is based on UN estimates of population 
from 1990 to 2050.   
† For this exercise, 2010 is chosen as the demographic base 
year for Australia. Using WGBU’s methodology, a 
demographic base year of 1990, 2000 or 2010 has little 
impact on the total Australian carbon budget. 
 
(Note that this approach should not be confused 
with the modified ‘contraction and convergence’ 
type approach used by Professor Garnaut to 
define Australia’s emission targets.41 Using this 
approach or others like it, would see Australia’s 
per capita emissions fall from today’s levels to 
converge with a defined emission level 
sometime in the future - generally global average 
per capita emissions in 2050. Given Australia’s 
current high levels of per capita emissions this 
would see a carbon budget of around 13-14 
billion tonnes to 2050.) 
 
+ Status quo: This approach allocates emissions 
based on the per cent of emissions that 
Australia contributed to global emissions 2000–
2010.‡ Using this method, Australia’s budget 
would be approximately 15 billion tonnes to 
2050. 
 
+ Ability to pay: As a rough measure of a nation’s 
ability to pay to contribute to global action, an 
Australian budget is defined based on 
comparing Australia’s 2010/11 Gross National 
Income to global gross income over the same 
period.§ 
 
+ Average: No single indicator gives a good 
reference point to judge the relative efforts of 
countries or what it actions they should take to 
reduce emissions.42 An average figure of the 
above indicators (population, emissions, and 
income) is therefore also shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
‡ Using the period 1990–2010 has little impact on the total 
Australian carbon budget.  
§ Based on World Bank data. Australia’s PPP 2010/11 GNI 
per capita is multiplied by the national population to define 
the gross national income. A similar calculation is undertaken 
for the world. The two are then divided.  
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Judging indicative Australian Carbon 
Budgets 
Fig. 7 summarises the 2010–2050 Australian carbon 
budgets based on the methods outlined above. The 
budgets range from around 4 billion tonnes to 15 
billion tonnes to 2050. At current emissions levels 
the lowest budget would be exhausted by the end 
of this decade while the larger budgets could 
accommodate current emissions levels until around 
2040. By itself, this gives little guidance for 
Australian decision-makers. Once the global goal is 
set, however, scientists can then advise on 
appropriate global budgets. Just how this pie should 
be shared is, ultimately, a question of equity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the last 50 years, the average Australian has 
emitted around 15 tonnes of carbon dioxide (only).43 
This compares around 11 tonnes for an average 
OECD citizen and 4 tonnes for an average global 
citizen. Australia’s per capita contribution to climate 
change has also been growing (on average) around 
twice the rate of world and the OECD nations over 
the last 50 years.   
To assess the equity implications of the indicative 
Australian budgets over the next 50 years, each is 
converted to a per-capita allocation§§. This is then 
compared to the per-capita budgets implied by the 
global carbon budget outlined above (see Fig. 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Summary of 
indicative 2010–2050 
Australian carbon 
budgets.  
 
Figure 8. Per capita 
carbon budgets (2010–
2050). World, 
Developed World 
average and Developing 
World average 
comparisons are 
reference points. They 
are based on the 
convergence of these 
groups’ emissions 
towards the point where 
the global budget 
consistent with a high 
chance of avoiding 2oC 
is achieved (average 
emissions per capita 
globally are around 0.5 
tonnes per year in 2050).  
 
§§This per-capita allocation is based on UN estimates of population from 1990 to 2050. Allocations are based on the average 
per-capita emissions in each scenario over the period 2010–2050. 
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Under all the assessed budgets (except that based 
on the Germany Advisory Council on Global 
Change) Australians would use significantly more of 
the global budget than an average person in either a 
developed or developing economy. This implies that 
budgets set on the basis of the current emissions 
targets, or Australia’s historical contribution to 
global emissions would be inequitable.  
For example, a budget based on the Government’s 
minimum target would see Australians use four 
times as much of the global budget as the average 
global citizen. This is in large part because 
Australia’s current per-capita emissions are among 
the highest in the developed world and historically 
have been growing at rates faster than most other 
advanced major emitting economies. 44  
Put another way if other countries emitted, per 
person, a comparable amount of emissions to that 
implied by Australia’s current emission targets then 
total emissions to 2050 would be equivalent to a 
world where temperatures increase by 4-6oC by 
2100.**    
Unless the metrics used to assess our equitable 
share of the global budget explicitly factors in our 
relatively small population’s high carbon footprint, 
then policy makers are implying it is acceptable for 
Australians to consume more of the global carbon 
budget than most other people for the next 40 
years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
**
 Based on total cumulative CO2-e emissions of between 
3,500-4,000 Gts to 2050.  
 
A fair contribution budget? 
A useful benchmark of fairness could be an 
assurance that, at minimum, the average Australian 
consumes no more of the global budget than the 
average person in other advanced economies. This 
has some similarities to an approach suggested by 
the Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency in setting 2020 targets: 
An outcome which sees Australia match the 
aggregate advanced country average would 
involve taking on larger economic costs and a 
more ambitious target, when national 
circumstances are taken into account. ... This is 
consistent with Australia’s desire to provide 
strong support and leadership for ambitious 
global action, and our recognition that Australia is 
expected to suffer greater harm from unmitigated 
climate change than most other advanced 
nations.45 (Emphasis added) 
This suggests an Australian carbon budget of 
around 8 billion tonnes from 2010 to 2050. 
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Implications of carbon budgets for 
emissions pathways 
How a carbon budget is defined can have an impact 
on short-term decision making and implications for 
a long-term emissions reduction pathway. If the 
Climate Change Authority does not consider a long-
term budget when it makes recommendations 
around short-term emissions pathway it increases 
the risk that more dramatic and draconian emissions 
reductions will be required post 2020. 
Fig. 9 illustrates this point: two ‘change track’ 
scenarios are illustrated where it is assumed that 
Australia is on an emissions pathway to a 5 per cent 
reduction on 2000 levels by 2020 and then adjusts 
post 2020 emissions to achieve a long-term national 
carbon budget. The 25/80 scenario assumes a 
budget consistent with the Government -25 budget 
and the Delayed 8 Gt scenario assumes a budget 
where Australia’s per capita contribution to avoiding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a 2oC world does not exceed that of other 
industrialised countries. Given a 5 per cent 
reduction is not a credible contribution to avoiding a 
2oC increase on global temperature a more credible 
pathway is also illustrated. 
Under all scenarios, the emission reductions in 2030 
are similar, around a 60 per cent reduction on 2000 
levels. However, the difference in the rates of 
emission reductions in the two decades is very 
different. For example, in the delayed scenarios 
average rates of emission reduction between now 
and 2020 is around 1 per cent per year. This jumps 
to between 8-10 per cent in the following decade. 
The more credible pathway delivers a more steady 
reduction in emissions, while deferring credible 
action sees much more rapid emission reductions 
post-2020. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Carbon budget accountability and emission pathways. The two ‘change track’ scenarios are 
included. One assumes that Australia sets a long-term carbon budget consistent with the Government -25 
by 2020 per cent and 80 per cent by 2050 budget outlined in the previous section The other assumes a 
national carbon budget of 8 Gt (assumes Australia’s per capita contribution to avoiding a 2oC world does 
not exceed that of other industrialised countries††††††).  However, in both cases the emissions pathway to 
2020 is set on the basis of the 5 per cent reduction target .A more credible emission pathway is also 
illustrated which includes a roughly 25 per cent reduction by 2020.  
 
††††††Under this scenario, post-2030, significant amount of international trade and negative-emissions technologies are required to achieve the 
overall budget. Under longer-term global emissions pathways that are consistent with avoiding a 2oC increase in global temperatures negative 
emissions are required in the second half of this century. Under scenarios that avoid a 1.5oC increase in global temperature, technologies that 
remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere become even more important as even greater negative emissions are required. A commonly 
cited potential negative emission technology is bioenergy combined with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). See O. Edenhofer, R. Pichs-
Madruga, Y. Sokona, K. Seyboth, P. Matschoss, S. Kadner, T. Zwickel, P. Eickemeier, G. Hansen, S. Schlömer, and C. von Stechow (eds), 
IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation. Prepared by Working Group III of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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An Australian carbon budget should be: 
1. Consistent with the national interest (as 
defined by the Act): Australia’s carbon budget 
should be based on a global budget which has a 
high probability of ‘ensuring that average global 
temperatures increase by not more than 2 
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels’. 
 
2. Focus on the long-term: The Climate Change 
Authority should outline an Australia’s carbon 
budget to 2050.  This would provide guidance to 
short-term cap setting processes and the 
longer-term indicative emissions pathway to 
2030 and 2050. There is little additional value in 
setting carbon budget to 2020 alone.  
 
3. Hedge against stronger action: The budget 
and associated emission pathways should be 
set to ensure it hedges against the possibility of 
even more ambitious action in the future (e.g. 
1.5oC global goal currently under consideration 
under the UNFCCC). 
 
In addition, the Climate Change Authority should be 
explicit in the equity judgements made in setting 
budgets, caps and trajectories. Defining a national 
contribution to avoiding climate change is ultimately 
not a scientific but an ethical judgement. For 
example, simply defining Australia’s carbon budget 
based on currently supported emission targets 
implies that Australians have a greater right to emit 
greenhouse gases than other global citizen.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Recommendations 
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